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New refusals on token operations in 3.2

Each DALP 3.2 token operation that keeps its shape but refuses a request 3.1 accepted, or refuses with a different code: what changed and what to do.

This page lists every token operation that refuses differently in DALP 3.2 (mints, burns, transfers, yield claims, fees, and prices). For platform-level refusals (list queries, audit trail, maker-checker, templates, documents, external tokens, compliance roles, and wallet factors), see New platform refusals in 3.2. For schema and SDK changes, see Upgrade an integration to 3.2.

New refusals on existing operations

These operations keep their 3.1 request and response shapes but reject requests 3.1 accepted or return new error codes. Generated clients do not flag them at compile time.

Gas refusals

What changed. Token writes refused because the paying account lacks gas now return 400 TRANSACTION_QUEUE_FUNDING_REQUIRED (DALP-14062, data.refusal: "FundingRequired", non-retryable), with data.transactionId when recorded. This covers direct token and token-feature writes, token role changes, synchronous token creates and price updates, and coordinated corporate-action preview, confirm, abort, and leg release steps.

When a self-paying smart wallet lacks gas, DALP returns 422 TRANSACTION_QUEUE_SMART_WALLET_GAS_REQUIRED (DALP-14034) with smartWalletAddress and shortfallWei in data.

Who is affected. Clients performing token writes, role updates, price updates, or coordinated corporate actions.

How to detect it. Writes return 400 with data.refusal: "FundingRequired" or 422 with DALP-14034.

What to do. Fund the paying account before retrying. Do not auto-retry DALP-14062. If a retry returns TRANSACTION_QUEUE_DUPLICATE_SETTLED (DALP-14066), inspect the original transaction and resend under a new Idempotency-Key. See Error handling.

Bundler wallet without a fee quote

What changed. POST /api/v2/organizations/networks/bundler now sizes funding from the network's live fee quote. If no fresh fee quote exists or the funding request cannot be recorded, it returns 503 (DALP-12250, retryable) instead of 200 with funding: "unknown".

Who is affected. Clients creating or repairing a bundler wallet and treating funding: "unknown" as success.

How to detect it. The call returns 503 instead of 200.

What to do. Retry after a short delay. The operation reuses the existing bundler wallet.

Mint and burn during a corporate action

What changed. Mints and burns on an asset are refused with 409 CORPORATE_ACTION_IN_FLIGHT (DALP-12067) while a corporate action run is in flight on that asset, from start until completion or abort. data.corporateActionId identifies the active run.

Who is affected. Every client that mints or burns, even when another operator started the corporate action.

How to detect it. Mint or burn calls return 409 CORPORATE_ACTION_IN_FLIGHT.

What to do. Wait for the run in data.corporateActionId to complete, or abort it, then resend the mint or burn. See Corporate actions.

Burns and forced transfers on a frozen address

What changed. Assets on the DALP 3.2 token contract now refuse burns from a fully frozen address with DALP-1076 (“Sender address frozen”) and forced transfers into one with DALP-1074 (“Recipient address frozen”). Multi-holder requests fail as a whole if any named address is frozen. Partial balance freezes do not block either operation.

Template-issued assets move to the 3.2 token contract when the organisation runs System updates. Assets from the seven original factories keep 3.1 behaviour, though the API still blocks maturity redemptions from a frozen holder on every asset.

Who is affected. Clients calling POST /api/v2/tokens/{assetId}/burns or POST /api/v2/tokens/{assetId}/forced-transfers on potentially frozen addresses.

How to detect it. Because the API does not pre-check address freezes on these routes, async writes return 202 Accepted and end FAILED with contractError.id DALP-1076 or DALP-1074. Calls with Prefer: wait return 422 CONTRACT_ERROR with that data.id.

What to do. Check data.holder.balance.isFrozen via GET /api/v2/tokens/{assetId}/holder-balances?holderAddress={address} first. Lift the freeze with PUT /api/v2/tokens/{assetId}/address-freezes (freeze: false), or forced-transfer from the frozen sender to an eligible wallet and burn there.

Burns that name a restricted wallet

What changed. DALP 3.2 introduces wallet restrictions. Operations targeting restricted wallets behave by operation type:

Operation
3.2 behaviour for restricted wallets
POST /api/v2/tokens/{assetId}/burns and burn preflights
Skips restricted wallets (system restriction or wallet restriction module), burns remaining wallets, and returns omitted addresses in optional skipped (on 200 and 202). Refuses with 409 TOKEN_ADDRESS_RESTRICTION_ACTIVE (DALP-9590) if every wallet is restricted.
v1 burn
Refuses the entire request with a v1 400 bad request naming the restricted wallet.
Buyback and partial redemption confirm
Omits restricted holders with skipReason: "restricted". Returns 409 DALP-9590 if no holder remains.
Reverse split, capital decrease, and rights close
On 3.2 token contracts, burns restricted holders in place via batchForcedBurn when executed by a smart wallet holding both custodian and supplyManagement. Otherwise skips them (409 DALP-9590 if no holder remains on reverse split or capital decrease, while rights close never returns 409). Reverse splits withhold cash in lieu in optional cashOwed. Older contracts use plain burn as in 3.1.
Minting corporate actions
Omits frozen addresses with skipReason: "restricted" (if restricted) or "frozen", minting to remaining holders instead of failing on chain.
Forced transfers
Allowed. Adds optional restrictedSenders to the response.
Forced conversions (POST /api/v2/tokens/{assetId}/features/conversion-minter/forced-conversions)
Refuses with 409 TOKEN_ADDRESS_RESTRICTION_ACTIVE (DALP-9590) when the holder has an active restriction in the asset's system or on the wallet restriction module. Refuses before checking walletVerification, under every debt method.

Who is affected. Clients that burn, force-transfer, force-convert, confirm corporate actions, or settle fund redemptions in any organisation using wallet restrictions or sharing a system with the wallet restriction module.

How to detect it. Burn responses (200 or 202) include skipped, or return 409 TOKEN_ADDRESS_RESTRICTION_ACTIVE (DALP-9590). Buyback, partial redemption, reverse split, capital decrease, and forced conversion calls return the same 409 DALP-9590 when refused. Corporate action holders carry skipReason ("restricted" or "frozen") or cashOwed.

What to do. Read skipped on every burn response and book only settled pairs. Update strict decoders to accept optional skipped, restrictedSenders, cashOwed, skipReason values restricted and frozen, and entries or DALP-9590 refusals (for burns, forced conversions, and corporate-action confirms) without restrictionId (omitted for other organisations' restrictions, module-only restrictions, or callers lacking owner, admin, complianceManager, or custodian access).

When a forced conversion returns DALP-9590, send it again after the holder's restriction is lifted while the trigger is active and the conversion window stays open.

To burn restricted holders in place during reverse splits, capital decreases, or rights closes, execute from a smart wallet with both custodian and supplyManagement. Raise at most one follow-up per run (a second returns 409 CORPORATE_ACTION_FOLLOW_UP_UNKNOWN, DALP-12069). After a restriction lift or unfreeze, run a follow-up for any skipReason: "restricted", skipReason: "frozen", or unpaid cashOwed entry. See Restricted holders.

The wallet restriction module

What changed. DALP 3.2 adds the system-wide wallet-restriction compliance module type, which blocks transfers from restricted wallets across every token in the system and blocks ordinary burns on 3.2 token contracts. Forced transfers and forced burns still bypass compliance modules.

The platform installs it automatically on new systems and during System updates on existing systems (loading all active restricted wallets). Until installed, transfers and burns keep 3.1 behaviour.

Surface
3.2 change
ComplianceTypeId and reads
Adds wallet-restriction. Returned by GET /api/v2/system/compliance-modules and token module reads once registered.
POST /api/v2/tokens
initialModulePairs[].typeId uses TokenComplianceTypeId and refuses wallet-restriction with 400 REQUEST_INVALID.
Manual module install routes
POST /api/v2/system/compliance-modules/configure (without instanceAddress), .../scoped, POST /api/v2/tokens/{assetId}/compliance-modules, and .../scoped refuse wallet-restriction with 409 compliance.module.STATE_INVALID (DALP-12285, data.reason: "system-installed-only"). v1 returns 409 CONFLICT (DALP-12285). POST /api/v2/system/compliance-modules/scope still scopes an installed module.
GET /api/v2/system/migration-comparison
May return component WALLET_RESTRICTION with optional walletRestriction (moduleInstalled, walletsMissing) and notFullyEnforced (reason: disabled or scoped). Counts in summary.needUpgrade only while outstanding is above 0.
Transfers from a restricted wallet
Frozen on the token: refused pre-queue with 422 CONTRACT_ERROR (DALP-1076). Not frozen on the token: queued and ends FAILED with contractError.id DALP-1120 (COMPLIANCE_CHECK_REASON_WALLET_RESTRICTED), or 422 CONTRACT_ERROR with Prefer: wait.

Who is affected. Clients creating wallet restrictions, transferring or burning from restricted wallets, decoding ComplianceTypeId, or installing compliance modules by type.

How to detect it. Installs return 409 with data.reason: "system-installed-only", module reads include wallet-restriction, and transfers fail with DALP-1076 or DALP-1120.

What to do. Accept wallet-restriction in decoders and exclude it from install and token-create requests. Treat DALP-1120 (COMPLIANCE_CHECK_REASON_WALLET_RESTRICTED) as a module block. Do not rely on GET /api/v2/restrictions alone because non-compliance callers get an empty list and direct module restrictions have no DALP restriction record. In an emergency, a Compliance manager can disable the module via POST /api/v2/system/compliance-module-instances/{instanceAddress}/transitions (preserves wallets) or remove it via DELETE /api/v2/system/compliance-modules (drops wallets until the next System update). See Global controls.

Settlements a restricted wallet delivers in

What changed. An active wallet restriction holds open positions where the restricted wallet delivers a covered token until the restriction is lifted or a position release is approved.

Flow
3.2 behaviour while held
XvP v2 (.../executions, .../approvals, .../secret-revelations)
Returns 409 XVP_POSITION_HELD_BY_RESTRICTION (DALP-211172) to every caller including counterparties, with data.restrictionId and data.positionId (restrictions from any organisation whose system created the settlement apply).
POST /api/v2/transaction-preparations and finalisation
Returns the same 409 DALP-211172 for execute(), approve(), or revealSecret(bytes) targeting a held settlement, leaving the preparation intact until release or expiry.
XvP v1 execute, approve, and reveal
Returns existing 422 precondition refusal (DALP-12324).
Trading venue fills and bank rail cash-outs
Venue fills park with reason wallet-restriction and cash-outs stay locked without returning a client error.

Who is affected. Clients executing, approving, or revealing XvP settlements (directly or via transaction preparations) and workflows tracking venue fills or cash-outs.

How to detect it. XvP and transaction-preparation calls return 409 DALP-211172 (v1 returns 422 DALP-12324), and venue fills remain parked with reason wallet-restriction.

What to do. Do not retry unchanged. Lift the restriction, or have a Compliance manager request a position release approved by a second user, then retry. Cancelling and post-expiry withdrawal remain allowed, and parked venue fills or held cash-outs resume automatically once released.

Maturity redemptions by a frozen holder

What changed. POST /api/v2/tokens/{assetId}/features/maturity-redemption/redemptions now refuses redemptions for a fully frozen signing holder before queueing, returning 422 CONTRACT_ERROR with DALP-1076 (“Sender address frozen”) on every token contract. Partial balance freezes do not block redeeming unfrozen units (3.2 contracts protect frozen units, while 3.1 contracts still draw them down).

Who is affected. Clients redeeming matured units on behalf of holders.

How to detect it. Redemptions return 422 CONTRACT_ERROR (DALP-1076) instead of 202 or 200. Validation runs in order: walletVerification, pause state, address freeze, then maturity, so a frozen holder gets DALP-1076 even before maturity.

Because the pre-check reads indexed state, a redemption sent before a freeze is indexed reaches the chain:

  • On 3.2 token contracts, the chain reverts it: queued calls end FAILED with contractError.id DALP-1076, while Prefer: wait or holder-signed calls return 409 MATURITY_REDEMPTION_UNAVAILABLE (DALP-12373).
  • On 3.1 token contracts, redemptions that reach the chain still burn frozen units and pay out.

What to do. Handle DALP-1076 and check data.holder.balance.isFrozen on GET /api/v2/tokens/{assetId}/holder-balances?holderAddress={address} before redeeming. After lifting the freeze with PUT /api/v2/tokens/{assetId}/address-freezes, wait until isFrozen reads false before retrying.

Mints and transfers refused before they are queued

What changed. POST /api/v2/tokens/{assetId}/mints, POST /api/v2/tokens/{assetId}/transfers, and POST /api/v2/tokens/{assetId}/preflights (mint and transfer) now refuse five invalid writes before queueing. All five are non-retryable and checked after walletVerification on writes. Preflights need no walletVerification and return data.clears: true when passing:

Condition
HTTP status and code
data details
Mint or transfer to a fully frozen recipient
422 CONTRACT_ERROR (DALP-1074)
“Recipient address frozen”
Transfer from a fully frozen sender (checked before balance)
422 CONTRACT_ERROR (DALP-1076)
“Sender address frozen”
Transfer to an unregistered recipient
422 CONTRACT_ERROR (DALP-1096)
data.args.reason: "identity-not-registered"
Mint exceeding the token's supply cap (compliance limits stay on-chain only)
422 CONTRACT_ERROR (DALP-4082)
data.args.newSupply, data.args.cap
Mint overflowing uint256 supply (2^256 - 1 base units)
409 TOKEN_MINT_SUPPLY_OVERFLOW (DALP-214341)
data.headroom (v1 returns 400 BAD_REQUEST)

Checks read indexed chain state: unindexed freezes or mints still revert on chain (FAILED with the same contractError.id), and recently lifted freezes, new registrations, or raised caps can be refused until indexed. Assets using Booked movements, Canton instruments, burns, and forced transfers skip these pre-checks.

Who is affected. Clients that mint or transfer, or wait for FAILED transactions to detect these conditions.

How to detect it. Writes return 422 CONTRACT_ERROR or 409 TOKEN_MINT_SUPPLY_OVERFLOW immediately without queueing.

What to do. Handle all five codes on the write response while retaining contractError.id handling on FAILED transactions. Use POST /api/v2/tokens/{assetId}/preflights before prompting for a PIN. Unfreeze via PUT /api/v2/tokens/{assetId}/address-freezes (or lift a wallet restriction if it returns 409 TOKEN_ADDRESS_RESTRICTION_ACTIVE), register unregistered recipients, or reduce the mint amount to fit data.args.cap or data.headroom.

Amounts in transfers, forced transfers and burns

What changed. Every transfers[].amount in POST /api/v2/tokens/{assetId}/transfers and POST /api/v2/tokens/{assetId}/forced-transfers, every amounts entry in POST /api/v2/tokens/{assetId}/burns, and matching preflights actions now require a positive integer of base units up to 2^256 - 1. Zero, negative numbers, decimals, exponent notation, and larger values return 400 REQUEST_INVALID naming the field (for example, transfers.0.amount). Mints continue to refuse zero with 400 TOKEN_MINT_AMOUNT_INVALID (DALP-9484).

Who is affected. Clients sending zero, fractional, or scientific-notation amounts to transfers, forced transfers, or burns.

How to detect it. Requests return 400 REQUEST_INVALID with the amount field in data.errors.

What to do. Omit zero-amount entries and format every amount as a positive integer string in plain digits.

Yield claims on a frozen address

What changed. Interest claims and fixed-yield coupon claims now refuse a fully frozen holder address with DALP-9295 (matching dividend claims). Lost-wallet recovery claims are refused while either the lost wallet or replacement wallet is fully frozen. Interest and coupons continue accruing while frozen and pay out after unfreezing. Partial freezes do not block claims.

Who is affected. Clients calling POST /api/v2/tokens/{assetId}/features/interest-yield/claims, POST /api/v2/tokens/{assetId}/features/fixed-treasury-yield/claims, or their recovered-wallet-claims routes.

How to detect it. Queued claims end FAILED with contractError.id DALP-9295, or return 422 CONTRACT_ERROR (DALP-9295) with Prefer: wait.

What to do. Check data.holder.balance.isFrozen via GET /api/v2/tokens/{assetId}/holder-balances?holderAddress={address} first and claim after lifting the freeze.

Fee recipient changes

What changed. On the DALP 3.2 management fee feature (activated by System updates), PATCH /api/v2/tokens/{assetId}/features/aum-fee pays accrued fees to the old recipient before switching recipients. The update fails without changing the recipient if the asset is halted (DALP-1109), the old recipient is frozen (DALP-1074), or the old recipient fails compliance (DALP-1110).

Who is affected. Clients updating a management fee recipient.

How to detect it. Async requests return 202 Accepted and end FAILED with DALP-1109, DALP-1074, or DALP-1110 (or 422 CONTRACT_ERROR with Prefer: wait). Successful changes record a fee payout to the old recipient.

What to do. Resume the asset or unfreeze and re-verify the old recipient before switching recipients, and reconcile the automatic payout.

Pause and resume codes

What changed. On the DALP 3.2 token contract, halting an already halted asset reverts with DALP-1109 and resuming an active asset reverts with DALP-9059 (the reverse of older contracts). PATCH /api/v2/tokens/{assetId}/pause-state also pre-checks indexed state and refuses redundant requests with DALP-9488. Contract codes surface when chain state leads the index, either in contractError.id or 422 CONTRACT_ERROR with Prefer: wait.

Who is affected. Clients branching on DALP-1109 or DALP-9059 after a halt or resume.

How to detect it. A redundant halt returns DALP-1109 instead of DALP-9059, and a redundant resume returns the reverse.

What to do. Treat DALP-9488, DALP-1109, and DALP-9059 uniformly as “the asset is already in the requested pause state”.

Prices with too many decimals

What changed. Token price updates, price-feed submissions, and initial prices on token creation now refuse values with more decimal places than the feed stores, returning 400 FEED_PRICE_NOT_REPRESENTABLE (DALP-12245, non-retryable). 3.1 truncated extra digits toward zero.

Who is affected. Clients sending unrounded price strings.

How to detect it. Price writes return 400 FEED_PRICE_NOT_REPRESENTABLE naming the price and feed decimals.

What to do. Round or format prices to the feed's configured decimals before submitting.